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Gilat Levy†
Abstract
In this paper I analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information
provided by others. I ﬁnd that decision makers who are motivated by reputation
concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public information
such as the prior or others’ recommendations. I also ﬁnd that some decision makers
may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers although advice is costless.
Moreover, advisers to the decision maker may not report their information truthfully.
Even if the advisers care only about the outcome, they bias their recommendation since
they anticipate ineﬃcient anti-herding behavior by the decision maker.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D82; D83.
Keywords: Reputation; Anti-herding.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the biblical story about Abshalom and David, Abshalom consults Ahitophel and asks
for his advice how to capture the throne from David - Abshalom’s father. Ahitophel oﬀers
Abshalom to lead a battalion of 12,000 soldiers in order to force David to surrender. God,
according to the story, intervenes and prevents Abshalom from following the sound advice,
so that David eventually prevails. The sub-text is provided by the bible’s interpreters, who
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1claim that Abshalom did not follow Ahitophel’s advice because he feared that the glory of
victory would go to Ahitophel rather than to himself.1 There are more recent examples of
decision makers who choose to ignore advice or go against public opinion. President Truman’s
decision to ﬁre General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War was in deﬁance of public
opinion.2 The decision of President Ford in 1976, to intervene (diplomatically) in the internal
aﬀairs in Rhodesia was a surprising decision; not only was it against public opinion, but also
in contradiction to Ford’s previous actions and announcements, that suggested that he did
not believe that it was in the national interest of Americans.3
In this paper I oﬀer a career concerns explanation to the behavior of decision makers who
ignore or contradict advice, go against the herd or even against their own belief. Career
concerns have been recognized as a cause for ineﬃcient decision making, since Fama (1980),
Lazear and Rosen (1982) and Holmström (1982). More recently, several papers focused
on the link between career concerns and the tendency of managers to ‘herd’, that is, to
follow others’ advice or actions while ignoring and suppressing their own information (see for
example Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2002, Zwiebel, 1995, Eﬃnger
and Polborn, 2001 and Prendergast and Stole, 1996). But, as Zwiebel (1995) notes, in
many situations it seems more likely that the reputation gained from outperforming the
competition would exceed the reputation gained from equal success across the board. As
a result, decision makers may ‘anti-herd’ and reject advice. The aim of this paper is to
demonstrate the conditions for anti-herding behavior and its implications.
I analyze the following model. A decision maker has a private signal about the state of the
world, and the accuracy of this signal depends on her ability. There is a public prior, which
determines what is the likely state of the world.4 The decision maker takes an action based
on the prior and her own private information. An evaluator observes the state of the world,
the prior, and the action taken by the decision maker. On the basis of these observations, the
evaluator can assess the quality of the decision maker’s private information, which reﬂects
her respective ability. The decision maker is concerned about the evaluator’s assessment of
her ability. A high assessment can be translated into higher wages or promotion.5
1The Interpreter’s Bible (New York: Abingdon Press, 1953), vol. 2.
2This is probably the most famous example of a President taking a decision against public opinion. See
Dennis D. Weinstock, Truman, MacArthur and the Korean War, Greenwood Press, 1999, chapters 9 and 10.
3William G. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Random House, 1987.
4The prior can be formed for example given others’ public recommendations.
5We can therefore think of the evaluator as representing ﬁrm owners in the market, who search for talented
2I ﬁnd that in the unique equilibrium of the model, the decision maker excessively contradicts
the prior. Even when she believes that the prior is correct, she may go against it, a behavior
which I term ‘anti-herding’.6 Intuitively, if the decision maker takes an action that follows the
public prior, she reveals that her own information may not be accurate enough. If, however,
the decision maker’s action goes against the prior, or against the herd, she suggests that her
own information is at least as accurate as the prior. Thus, going against public information
can serve as a signal about ability, which implies that decision makers have an excessive
incentive to use it. Thereby in equilibrium they distort their actions in this direction.
In the model, I also allow the decision maker to decide how much information to aggregate
before taking her decision.7 That is, she can choose to consult an adviser who provides
public advice. I ﬁn dt h a tt h em o s ta b l ed e c i s i o nm a k e r sc h o o s en o tt oc o n s u l t ,i n e ﬃciently.
In particular, the signal of anti-herding can be substituted by the signal of not gathering
information at all. Intuitively, if the decision maker chooses not to check the content of
available information, she shows even a greater conﬁdence in her ability. I then compare
between the two types of signals, that of not soliciting information and that of contradicting
available information. I ﬁnd that decision makers behave even less eﬃciently when they use
the signal of not soliciting information.
Finally, I ask whether advisers to the decision maker indeed report their information truth-
fully. If such an adviser has career concerns himself, he may wish to pose as a talented type
and hence manipulate his recommendation. I show that advisers bias their recommenda-
tions even if they do not have career concerns but care only about the outcome. It is the
anticipated anti-herding behavior of the decision maker which induces them to distort their
recommendations. Thus, career concerns of either agent, be it the adviser or the decision
maker, are suﬃcient to induce sub-optimal sharing of information.
Anti-herding results are derived in the literature in several contexts and under a variety
of assumptions. I ﬁnd that in terms of the decision maker’s objectives, the decision maker
managers. This accords with the career concerns view of Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986), in which
the wage is a function of the market’s perception of the ability of the manager. A diﬀerent type of career
concerns arises when agents are induced to signal their preferences, instead of their ability. This type of
career concerns is analyzed for example by Morris (2000).
6Herding is deﬁned as the behavior of decision makers who follow others’ recommendations while ignoring
their own information (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, Banerjee, 1992).
7As far as I know, no other paper analyzes whether managers solicit advice or information in the context
of career concerns.
3must be motivated by career concerns. I illustrate though that anti-herding arises even if the
decision maker has only reputation concerns and does not care about the outcome at all. For
example, Prendergast and Stole (1996) analyze a dynamic model in which managers initially
overreact to their own information compared to a common market prior, and then ‘herd’
relative to their own previous decisions later in their career. In their model they assume
suﬃciently high outcome concerns. I show that reputation concerns alone are suﬃcient.
In my setting, career concerns are individualistic. That is, the decision maker cares only
about the perception of the evaluator about her type. There is no direct competition with
other managers in the market. Given that career concerns are individualistic, I show that a
necessary condition for anti-herding is that the decision maker knows her type. Intuitively,
when the decision maker does not know her type, she can only signal it by taking the correct
decision, which accords with eﬃciency. Hence, anti-herding cannot arise.8
Indeed, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) who initiated the reputational herding literature,
assume that decision makers do not know their type and ﬁnd that herding may arise.9 Avery
and Chevalier (2001), however, show that when the decision maker has suﬃcient information
about her type, the resulting behavior is anti-herding. In their paper they assume that the
information of able agents is correlated. This assumption, as my model illustrates, is not
important for the derivation of anti-herding. Trueman (1994) was the ﬁrst to set up a model
in which an expert knows her type and tries to signal it to the market. His model is essentially
at w o - t y p em o d e la n da sar e s u l th ed e r i v e sa nti-herding only for some parameters.10 Here
I generalize anti-herding results found in Trueman (1994), Avery and Chevalier (2001) and
Prendergast and Stole (1996) for any distribution over types and for various assumptions
about the information held by the players.11 In addition, I extend this literature by analyzing
8The literature on reputation is split on the assumption whether agents know their type or not. Holmström
(1982) and Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986) assume that agents do not know their type, whereas Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) assume that agents do know their type.
9They assume that information among smart managers is correlated as opposed to untalented managers.
Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000), however, prove that the assumption of correlated information among talented
managers is not necessary for the derivation of herd behavior; decision makers who do not know their type,
can signal it only by taking the right decision. Thus, herd behavior arises in the presence of career concerns,
exactly as in the models in which decision makers simply care about taking the correct action (see Banerjee,
1992, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992).
10A version of his model can be found in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2002).
11In particular, I show that anti-herding arises also if the evaluator does not observe the state of the world,
and when the evaluator or the decision maker do not observe the accuracy of the prior.
4other implications of anti-herding, such as how it aﬀects advisers to the decision maker and
her inclination to consult at all.
Eﬃnger and Polborn (2001) analyze a model in which experts do not know their type, as
in Scharfstein and Stein (1990). They derive the beneﬁtf o rt h ee x p e r tf r o mf u n d a m e n t a l s ,
and create a beneﬁt function such that an expert is most valuable if he is the only smart
expert. This induces an incentive for agents to diﬀerentiate themselves. Thus, since experts
directly compete in their model (i.e., career concerns are not individualistic), they can derive
anti-herding in a set up in which decision makers do not know their type.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and a benchmark
analysis of an eﬃcient decision maker. Section 3 presents the main result; I derive the anti-
herding result and its generalizations. Section 4 extends the model by allowing the decision
maker to decide how much information to aggregate and also examines how much information
advisers provide to the decision maker. Section 5 concludes and the appendix contains all
p r o o f s ,w h i c ha r en o ti nt h et e x t .
2 The model
The players and the action space
There are two players in the game, a decision maker D, a n da ne v a l u a t o rE. The decision
maker must take an action, a. For simplicity, suppose there are only two possible actions,
a ∈ {l,h}.Dgains utility from advancing her career. That is, if E believes that D is an able
decision maker, she can be rewarded with high wages or a promotion. Hence, the decision
maker tries to signal to E that she is able. E, on the other hand, tries to guess the decision
maker’s true type or ‘ability’. E’s action is therefore to form beliefs on the type of D, as will
be explained below.
The information structure
T h e r ei sa nu n d e r l y i n gs t a t eo ft h ew o r l dw, w h i c hi su n k n o w na n di sr e a l i z e do n l ya f t e r
the action a is taken. There are two possible states, which are also denoted by l or h.
Let action l be appropriate in state l and action h be appropriate in state h. There is a
common knowledge prior distribution on the states of the world. The prior can summarize
previous public information, such as other’s actions or recommendations. In particular, let
Pr(w = h)=q, for q ∈ (.5,1) whereas Pr(w = l)=1− q.
(i) The information of D : The decision maker receives a private signal s ∈ {l,h} about
5the state of the world. T h em o r ea b l ei sD, the more likely it is that her signal is reliable.
In particular, let p represent the ability of D and assume that Pr(s = w|w,p)=p. D knows
p, which is drawn from a continuous density function f(p) on [.5,1].
Given the prior q, a n dh e ro w ni n f o r m a t i o n(s,p), the decision maker D forms the following






pq+(1−p)(1−q) if s = h,
(1−p)q





where Pr(w = l|s,p,q)=1− Pr(w = h|s,p,q).
(ii) The information of E : The evaluator observes neither the signal s of the decision
maker nor her type p, about which he forms beliefs.Eknows that p is distributed on [.5,1]
according to f(p). I assume that E observes the action a chosen by D, the realized state of
the world ω, and the prior q.
The objectives of the players, strategies, and equilibria
E updates his beliefs about p rationally. Denote E0s posterior expectations about p by π.
That is, π = E(p|q,w,a), where (q,w,a) is the information of E. The objective of E is to
g u e s st h et y p eo fD correctly. Deﬁne I =1if w = a and I =0otherwise. The objective
of D is to maximize π + θI, for θ ≥ 0. θ is a parameter that measures how strong are the
outcome concerns of D.
The strategy of D is to pick a, that is, a function α :( s,p,q) → {l,h}. Similarly, E uses
a belief updating function π :( q,w,a) → [.5,1]. I use the concept of a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium to solve the model. I analyze only informative equilibria, i.e., when the strategy
of the decision maker is responsive to her signal. Moreover, I ignore “mirror” equilibrium,
i.e., an equilibrium that takes an original equilibrium and switches each action from l to h
and vice versa.
The timing of the game:
1. q, the accuracy of the prior, is observed (where q =P r ( w = h) and q>1
2).
2. w is realized and D receives a private signal, (s,p), about w.
3. D takes an action a.
4. w b e c o m e so b s e r v a b l ea n dE forms beliefs on p, given a,w,q and f(p).
Benchmark: an eﬃcient decision maker
As a benchmark, let us consider the behavior of an eﬃcient decision maker, who cares only
about taking the correct decision. This implies that she should take h if Pr(w = h|s,p,q) ≥
6Pr(w = l|s,p,q). By (1), this implies that if s = h, the decision maker takes h, whereas if
s = l, the decision maker takes h as long as p ≤ q.12 Otherwise, if p>q ,that is, her accuracy
is greater than that of the prior, she takes l.
It is useful to describe such a cutoﬀ point strategy in the following graph, which will
accompany the analysis throughout. The right part of the graph describes the action of the
decision maker when s = l, for p ranging from .5 to 1. The left part of the graph, describes
the decision maker’s action when s = h, and p ranges from .5 (in the middle) to 1 (in the
l e f t ) .T h u s ,a sw eg of r o ml e f tt or i g h t ,Pr(w = l|s,p) increases. The cutoﬀ point, which in
the eﬃcient case is at (s = l,p = q), is such that for all information (s,p) to the right of it,
D takes l, whereas for all information (s,p) to its left, D takes h :
 
p=.5 p=1 p=1  p=q
s=h  s=l 
a=h  a=l 
Figure 1: The eﬃcient benchmark
3R e s u l t s
The incentives of the careerist decision maker are not necessarily aligned with eﬃcient de-
cision making, and hence she may distort her actions. I now analyze the behavior of the
careerist decision maker in equilibrium and its sensitivity to the parameters of the model.
L e tu sd e ﬁne the following reputation function: π(a,w,α) is the expectations of E on D0s
type, when E observes her action a, the state of the world w, a n du p o nc o n j e c t u r i n gs o m e
strategy α.13 Essentially, E needs to update his beliefs about the density of each type, given





(Pr(s = w|w,p)Pr(α(s,p,q)=s)+P r ( s 6= w|w,p)Pr(α(s,p,q) 6= s))f(p)
R 1
.5(Pr(s = w|w,p)Pr(α(s,p,q)=s)+P r ( s 6= w|w,p)Pr(α(s,p,q) 6= s))f(p)dp
dp
Hence, π(a,a,α) denotes the reputation that D receives if she is correct (where a = w),
whereas π(a,a0,α) denotes the reputation that she receives if she is wrong (a 6= a0,a 0 = w).
Since D knows that E knows w, D believes that she receives the reputation π(a,a,α) if
indeed she is correct. This occurs with Pr(w = a|s,p,q) which is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) . We
12At s = l and p = q, Pr(w = h|s,p,q)=P r ( w = l|s,p,q).
13I omit the index q from the beliefs of E, s i n c eg i v e nt h eo b s e r v a t i o no fw, q may aﬀect the beliefs of the
evaluator only through the decision maker’s strategy.
7can therefore describe the utility of D from taking an action a, in the following way:
Pr(w = a|s,p,q)(π(a,a,α)+θ)+( 1− Pr(w = a|s,p,q))π(a,a
0,α)
The ﬁrst Lemma characterizes the strategy of the decision maker in any equilibrium.
Lemma 1 In any informative equilibrium, the decision maker uses a strategy α∗ which
is characterized by a cutoﬀ point (s∗,p ∗), such that the decision maker takes h if Pr(w =
h|s,p,q) ≥ Pr(w = h|s∗,p ∗,q), and otherwise she takes l.
Figure 2 describes an example of a cutoﬀ point strategy for the decision maker, with
s∗ = h. Recall that the right part of the ﬁgure depicts p ∈ [.5,1] for s = l whereas the left
part depicts D0s types with s = h, so that Pr(w = l|s,p) increases from left to right. The
ﬁgure illustrates that given a cutoﬀ point (s∗,p ∗), the decision maker takes l for all (s,p) to
the right of (s∗,p ∗),a n dt a k e sh for all (s,p) to its left.
p=.5 p=1 p=1  s*,p*
s=h  s=l 
a=l  a=h 
Figure 2: A cutoﬀ point strategy with s∗ = h.
Proof: In an informative equilibrium, some types of D take l whereas some types take h.
This implies that there must be at least one type (s,p) who is indiﬀerent between taking l
and h. That is, the following condition must hold for some (s,p):
Pr(w = l|s,p,q)(π(l,l,α)+θ)+P r ( w = h|s,p,q))π(l,h,α)








T h er i g h t - h a n d - s i d eo f( 2 )i sﬁxed for all (s,p), since these are the beliefs of the evaluator.
The evaluator does not know (s,p) and hence cannot condition his beliefs on this information.








(1−p)(1−q) for s = h
q(1−p)





8For s = h, (3) is strictly increasing in p, and for s = l, (3) is strictly decreasing in p. Since
both expressions are equal for p = 1
2, there can be at most one pair (s∗,p ∗) that satisﬁes
equation (2). Thus, there is a unique cutoﬀ point (s∗,p ∗), such that if Pr(w = h|s,p,q) ≥
Pr(w = h|s∗,p ∗,q) the decision maker takes h, and otherwise, she takes l.¥
The strategy of the careerist decision maker is therefore similar to that of the eﬃcient
decision maker, who uses a cutoﬀ strategy, with s∗ = l and p∗ = q. We therefore have to
check what cutoﬀ point the reputational incentives of the careerist decision maker induce
her to choose. As a ﬁrst step, we can impose more structure on the beliefs of the evaluator
E whenever he conjectures that D uses a cutoﬀ point strategy (s∗,p ∗):
Lemma 2 (i) For any action a, π(a,a,α∗) > π(a,a0,α∗), (ii) If s∗ = l, then π(l,l,α∗) >
π(h,h,α∗) and π(l,h,α∗) > π(h,l,α∗), (iii) If s∗ = h, then π(h,h,α∗) > π(l,l,α∗) and
π(h,l,α∗) > π(l,h,α∗).
Proof: see the appendix.¥
The Lemma follows from Bayesian updating. The ﬁrst part asserts that the reputation of
D is higher if she takes the correct decision; this can arise as a signal on ability since D is
more likely to receive the correct signal when she is able, and her strategy is responsive to
her signal. In addition, the lemma asserts the following; if s∗ = l, the reputation that E
attributes to those who take l, whether they succeed or fail in taking the right decision, is
higher than the reputation they receive when they take h.I n t u i t i v e l y ,w h e ns∗ = l, D takes
l only if p>p ∗ ( a si nF i g u r e1 ,w h i c hd e s c r i b e sa ne ﬃcient decision maker). Hence, E knows
that if a = l, it must be that p>p ∗, whereas if a = h, D may admit a lower type, of p<p ∗.
T h eo p p o s i t eh a p p e n sw h e ns∗ = h (as in the example described in Figure 2). In this case,
higher reputation is attributed to those who take h.
Given Lemma 2, the next result helps us to focus our analysis:
Lemma 3 In equilibrium, s∗ = l.
Proof: To ﬁnd an equilibrium, we have to ﬁnd the cutoﬀ p o i n tt h a ts a t i s ﬁes the following
ﬁxed point equation (that is, equation (2) with correct beliefs for the evaluator):
Pr(w = h|s∗,p ∗,q)





Assume now that s∗ = h. Such a value implies that the right-hand-side of (4) is smaller than
1 by Lemma 2, whereas the left-hand-side of (4) is greater than 1 by equation (3). As a
result, s∗ = h cannot solve (4).¥
9Intuitively, when the prior is contradicted by too many types of the decision maker, the
evaluator may realize that a decision maker who contradicts is not necessarily an able one.
Higher reputation would be attributed to those who follow the prior. Moreover, types with
s = h, are more likely to take the right decision when they follow the prior and hence receive
a high reputation (as well as θ). This implies that all types with s = h would rather follow
t h ep r i o r ,s on os u c ht y p ec a nb ei n d i ﬀerent. A cutoﬀ point with s∗ = h cannot be sustained.
Given that s∗ = l in equilibrium, we can now concentrate our analysis on ﬁnding p∗. Note
that if in equilibrium, p∗ = q, then it implies that the decision maker behaves eﬃciently. We
can say that the decision maker behaves more (less) eﬃciently the closer (further) is p∗ to
q. If p∗ >q ,it means that the decision maker takes h even when she thinks that w is more
likely to be l. This is what we call excessively following the prior,o r‘ herding’. If, on the
other hand, the equilibrium value admits p∗ <q ,the decision maker takes l even when she
thinks that w is more likely to be h. This is what we call excessively contradicting the prior,
or ‘anti-herding’.14 The ﬁrst Proposition establishes that anti-herding arises in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (the Anti-Herding result): For all θ ≥ 0, there exists a unique informative
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, anti-herding arises and the decision maker excessively con-
tradicts the prior. The decision maker behaves more eﬃciently when outcome concerns are
stronger. Also, when the accuracy of the prior q increases, the decision maker follows the
prior more often. However, when career concerns are strong enough, then no matter how
high q is, a distortion always arises.
Proof: see the appendix.¥
Figure 3 describes the behavior of the decision maker in equilibrium. The ﬁgure focuses on
the region of s = l and shows the area (p∗,q) in which D contradicts the prior, ineﬃciently.
  a=h 




Figure 3: The equilibrium strategy of a careerist decision maker
In equilibrium, a trade-oﬀ is created between two types of signals: contradicting the prior
and taking the right decision. In order to focus on the reputational trade-oﬀ, assume that
14My deﬁnition of herding and anti-herding is similar to that of Prendergast and Stole (1996).
10θ =0 , i.e., the decision maker has only career concerns. First, contradicting the prior is a
signal for high ability. This is so because only the most able decision makers take this route.
On the other hand, taking the correct action always enhances reputation because it indicates
that the decision maker has received, on average, a correct signal.
Consider now a type with p<q .When this type follows the prior, she is more likely to take
the correct decision, since she utilizes more information. As taking the correct decision is a
signal for high ability, this increases her reputation. On the other hand, if she contradicts the
prior she receives high reputation. But, she is more likely to be wrong and receive the low
reputation attached to a failure. Formally, π(l,l,α) > π(h,h,α) and π(l,h,α) > π(h,l,α)
in equilibrium, but when a type p<qcontradicts the prior she is more likely to receive
π(l,h,α) whereas when she follows the prior she is more likely to receive π(h,h,α), where
π(h,h,α) > π(l,h,α). Thus, low types cannot fully mimic the able types who contradict the
prior, because they are more likely to fail. The evaluator knows the state of the world and
can ‘punish’ those that take the wrong decision by holding them, and rightly so, in lower
regard. Thus, the tension between the two types of incentives determines the equilibrium
level of contradiction.
To see that excessive contradiction must arise, i.e., that p∗ <q ,note that otherwise, if
p∗ ≥ q, no trade-oﬀ arises. Both the reputation from contradicting the prior is higher at
any state, and also types with p ≥ q are more likely to take the right decision when they
contradict the prior, and hence receive high reputation for being correct. Thus, no type with
p ≥ q can be indiﬀerent, implying that in equilibrium p∗ <q .
The proposition also characterizes the decision maker’s behavior as a function of the pa-
rameters of the model, q and θ. Intuitively, when q increases, the beneﬁtf r o mf o l l o w i n gt h e
prior, everything else being equal, is higher. This is because the terms of the reputational
trade-oﬀ change; it becomes more likely to receive the (higher) reputation for taking the
correct decision. Hence, more types are inclined to follow the prior, that is, the cutoﬀ point
p∗ increases.15
However, the Proposition states that for small values of θ, eﬃciency, or a behavior which is
close to eﬃcient, cannot be achieved for all values of q. The implication of this result is that
15This only implies that more types follow the prior but not necessarily that the size of the distortion, i.e.,
q −p∗ is smaller. Note for example that when q → 1
2, the distortion is the smallest since the decision maker
behaves eﬃciently; without almost any prior public knowledge about what is the right state, the only way
to signal ability is by taking the correct decision.
11the distortion due to career concerns is substantial; even if q admits high values, for example
q → 1, the cutoﬀ point p∗ is strictly below 1 and there is a positive measure of types who
behave ineﬃciently. For example, when θ =0and the density over types f(p) is uniform, I
ﬁnd that p∗ is bounded by 0.625. Thus, when q → 1, all types in (0.625,1) take the wrong
decision, consciously and ineﬃciently.
To see why p∗ is bounded, consider the case of θ =0 . Note that if the evaluator conjectures
that p∗ is very high, for example p∗ → 1, then π(l,·,α∗) > π(h,·,α∗). That is, the reputation
from contradicting the prior is higher than that from following the prior regardless of the
state of the world, since those who contradict the prior are only the most able types, with
p → 1.I np a r t i c u l a r ,π(l,h,α∗) > π(h,h,α∗), i.e., even if the decision maker contradicts the
prior and is found wrong, her reputation is higher compared to the scenario in which she
follows the prior and is found correct. Thus, if these are the beliefs of the evaluator, any
type of decision maker would rather contradict the prior. This implies that such beliefs for
the evaluator cannot be sustained, for any q. Consequently, there is an upper bound on the
cutoﬀ point.16
Finally, note that in terms of the objectives of the decision maker, career concerns are
an important condition; in particular, the distortion becomes smaller when the reputation
motive decreases, and in the limit, when career concerns vanish, the decision maker behaves
eﬃciently. Moreover, the Proposition illustrates that anti-herding arises when the decision
maker is solely motivated by career concerns, i.e., even in the absence of outcome concerns.17
In o we x a m i n ew h i c ho ft h ea s s u m p t i o n sa b o u tt h ei n f o r m a t i o ns t r u c t u r eo ft h ep l a y e r si s
necessary for the derivation of anti-herding:
Proposition 2 For all θ ≥ 0, anti-herding is an equilibrium phenomenon when the evalu-
ator does not observe the state of the world, or when the evaluator or the decision maker do
not observe the accuracy of the prior. On the other hand, anti-herding cannot arise in any
equilibrium if the decision maker does not know her type or if the evaluator cannot observe
whether her action contradicts or follows the prior.
Proof: see the appendix.¥
16The feature that p∗ is bounded for all values of q will turn out to be important, since it implies that
when q is high enough anti-herding must arise in an informative equilibrium, even if we change some of the
assumptions of the model.
17Prendergast and Stole (1996) assume the existence of outcome concerns in order to derive a fully sepa-
rating equilibrium. I show that at least for a semi-separating equilibrium, career concerns are enough.
12I now explain the intuition of the result, which illustrates the robustness of anti-herding
and the conditions under which it prevails. I ﬁnd that anti-herding arises only if E observes
the action of the decision maker, or more precisely, whether the decision maker follows or
contradicts the prior. Otherwise, D can only signal her type by taking the correct decision
and will therefore behave eﬃciently.
In terms of the information that D holds, I ﬁnd that a crucial assumption is that D knows
her type p. Intuitively, if the decision maker does not know p, she does not know whether
her own information is more accurate than the prior and as a result cannot signal it. She
only knows her signal s, and can only report information about s. This implies that the only
way in which she can signal her type is by taking the correct decision.18
The Proposition shows that other assumptions are not important. For example, a common
assumption in the literature is that both E and D observe the accuracy of the prior q.19
Here, I show that the anti-herding result can be generalized beyond this assumption. Even
if each of them does not know the exact accuracy of the prior, they both know whether D
contradicts or follows the prior. Hence, the same trade-oﬀ described above can arise.
Finally, consider the scenario in which E does not observe w. This is highly relevant, since
for many decisions, it is never known whether they are correct or not.20 Two problems arise
in this case. The ﬁrst is to ensure that an informative equilibrium exists, for all θ ≥ 0.21 The
second is to ensure that anti-herding arises in equilibrium. But this is solved using the insight
gained in Proposition 1. The result there established that the cutoﬀ point p∗ is bounded
18Eﬃnger and Polborn (2001) derive anti-herding in a set up in which decision makers do not know their
type. They assume that there is a direct competition between experts, i.e., that a decision maker is valuable
only if she is considered the only smart decision maker. In this case, decision makers have an incentive
to diﬀerentiate themselves. The implication is therefore that decision makers must know their type for
anti-herding to arise, if career concerns are individualistic.
19I know of no paper in the herding/anti-herding literature that assumes diﬀerently.
20Consider for example judicial decision making. If there is no appeal, it is likely that we never ﬁnd out
whether the judge is right or wrong. See Levy (2002).
21When the evaluator does not observe w he cannot discipline the decision maker by ‘providing’ her
incentives to take the right decision. This is an obstacle for an informative equilibrium only when θ =0 ,
since when θ > 0 the decision maker is inherently motivated by taking the correct decision. I show in the
appendix that an informative equilibrium can exist even when θ =0 . In the equilibrium, the decision maker
behaves informatively but each of her types is indiﬀerent between contradicting and following the prior. The
only other paper that analyzes a career concerns model in which E does not observe w is Prendergast and
Stole (1996). In their model they indeed substitute this assumption by assuming suﬃciently high outcome
concerns. I show that this is not necessary, neither for existence nor for anti-herding.
13and cannot be ‘too high’, so that the interval of distortion (p∗,q) has a positive measure. If
p∗ is too high, then regardless of the state of the world, the reputation from contradicting
must be higher than that from following, which cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Since
this occurs regardless of the state of the world, it must be true also when E cannot observe
w. The cutoﬀ point is bounded in this case as well, for the same reason. As a result, when
q is high enough, the cutoﬀ is below q and anti-herding arises.
The ‘anti-herding’ eﬀect may create implications above and beyond those described above.
For example, if the prior is formed using reports of advisers, we can analyze whether the
decision maker chooses to consult at all. Additionally, we can analyze the incentives of the
advisers to transmit information to the decision maker, anticipating her contrarian behavior.
In what follows, I analyze extensions of the model to explore some of these implications.
4E x t e n s i o n s
So far, I assumed that there exists a known prior, which indicates that the state of the world
is likely to be h, with an accuracy q>1
2. Alternatively, we can model the formation of this
‘prior’ by assuming that it is based on previous information or advice which is public and
freely available to the decision maker. This allows us to endogenize some of the assumptions
about the parameter q.
Assume that the initial prior is the symmetric one, i.e., that each state can occur with
probability 1
2. There is an adviser who receives a signal about the state of the world. The
accuracy of the adviser’s signal is known to be q. If the adviser transmits his signal truthfully
(and publicly), then this structure is exactly identical to the structure assumed in the model.
In the ﬁrst extension, I analyze how much information the decision maker aggregates before
she takes her decision. That is, I allow the decision maker to decide whether to consult the
adviser or not and thus control the accuracy of her ‘prior’.
4.1 Strategic information aggregation
An adviser A receives a signal sA ∈ {l,h}, with accuracy q. That is, Pr(sA = w|w,q)=q>1
2.
The players E and D know the parameter q. In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the decision maker
can decide whether to consult her adviser or not, given q, her own information (s,p) and the
initial symmetric prior on the state of the world. I assume that consultation is costless and
that the adviser transmits his signal sA truthfully upon consultation. I also assume that the
decision whether to consult or not is observed by the evaluator E.T h et i m i n go ft h eg a m e
14is therefore the following:
1. It is common knowledge that Pr(w = h)=1
2 and that Pr(sA = w|w,q)=q.
2. w is realized, A learns sA ∈ {l,h}, and D receives a private signal (s,p) about w.
3. D may consult A and learn sA.
4. D takes an action a.
5. E forms beliefs on p, given a,w,q, the decision to consult, sA if she consults, and f(p).
The eﬃcient course of action is for D to consult the adviser and follow his advice when
p<qand follow her own signal s when p>q .But will D necessarily aggregate information?
Intuitively, if D decides not to gather additional information, she reduces the likelihood
of taking the appropriate action. But taking the correct action based only on her own
information, is a more challenging test than doing so after collecting advice. The willingness
of a decision maker to impose this test upon herself may show that she has faith in her own
private information. To ﬁnd if the decision not to consult can arise as a signal on ability,
Proposition 3 identiﬁes an equilibrium in which some types consult and some do not.22
Proposition 3 (The Strategic Consultation Result): When θ is suﬃciently high, there
exists an equilibrium in which some types do not consult. In particular, the most able decision
makers do not consult and follow their own signal whereas the less able decision makers
consult and follow advice. Moreover, distortion arises since decision makers with types p<q
do not consult as well.
Proof: see the appendix.¥
Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium behavior of the decision maker, given some signal s and
types p ∈ [.5,1]. In equilibrium, all types with p>p 0 do not consult and follow their own
signal, i.e., take a = s. All other types, i.e., p ∈ (.5,p 0), consult and follow advice (a = sA).
The area (p0,q) describes the ineﬃciency created by career concerns.
22An equilibrium in the model is deﬁned by an equilibrium in each of the continuation games calculated
given some beliefs of E that a type p that consults belongs to the set C ⊆ [.5,1] and a type p that acts
unilaterally belongs to the set U =[ .5,1]\C, and by the condition that a decision maker of type p ∈ U prefers
to act unilaterally and a decision maker of type p ∈ C prefers to consult. I focus on symmetric strategies,







Figure 4: Not consulting as a signal of ability
In this equilibrium, the following trade-oﬀ arises. Consulting an adviser may increase the
probability of taking the right decision (and receiving θ). However, choosing not to consult
allows the decision maker to be perceived as a high ability type, since only able types choose
to decide alone.23 Obviously, able types have suﬃciently accurate information so they can
opt for high reputation, whereas the less able types need to rely on advice in order to receive
θ and solve the trade-oﬀ by favouring consultation. Since the equilibrium separates between
those who do not consult, the most able, and those who consult, the least able, it can
exist only for high values of θ. Otherwise, the less able types are not ‘willing’ to distinguish
themselves. Finally, the equilibrium reveals ineﬃcient behavior on behalf of the decision
maker; as in the previous result, the cutoﬀ point is lower than q and hence some types with
p<qdistort their actions by not consulting, in order to signal high ability.
Consider now an equilibrium in which all types consult.24 Then, sA becomes public. Sup-
pose, without loss of generality, that sA = h. T h es t r u c t u r eo ft h eg a m ei sn o wi d e n t i c a lt o
the model analyzed in the previous section, in which the prior (that w = h, with accuracy
q) is public. Thus, the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 arises; there is a cutoﬀ point
p∗ <q .If s 6= sA, i.e., s = l, and p>p ∗,Dtakes l and otherwise she takes h. In other words,
if p<p ∗, D follows advice whereas if p>p ∗,Dplans to ignore advice and to follow her own
signal, s. If it turns out that sA = s, then she appears to follow advice (as do able types with
s = h in our example); while if sA 6= s, i.e., s = l, she appears to contradict advice. This
equilibrium, as Proposition 1 implies, exists for all values of θ. For convenience, the next
ﬁgure repeats the description of this equilibrium, this time for a general s and p ∈ [.5,1] :
23Intuitively, if reputation for acting unilaterally would be low, then none of the decision maker’s types
would follow this route, which is inferior to consulting and following advice both in terms of career and
outcome concerns.
24For all θ, such an equilibrium can be sustained with proper out-of-equilibrium beliefs for the evaluator.
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Figure 5: Contradicting advice as a signal of ability.
When D can choose whether to consult, there may exist two equilibria with a similar
structure. In both, the most able decision makers act on the basis of their own information
only (i.e., ignore information or do not collect it), whereas the less able decision makers
follow advice. As a result, the signal of not consulting and the signal of contradicting advice
may be substitutable; both D’s decision whether to consult or not and her choice of how to
use the advice she obtains can serve as signalling devices.
It is therefore interesting to investigate which of the equilibria described in Figures 4 and
5i sm o r ee ﬃcient, i.e., which yields higher probability of taking the right decision:25
Proposition 4 The probability of making the right decision is higher when the decision
maker signals her type by contradicting advice.
Proof: see the appendix.¥
Intuitively, in the equilibrium in which the most able decision makers signal their type
by not consulting (Figure 4) there is a high degree of separation between types. Since the
decision to consult is public, all the types who do not consult distinguish themselves from less
able types. On the other hand, the equilibrium in which contradicting advice is a signal of
ability (Figure 5) is characterized by a high degree of pooling; the more able decision makers
ignore advice but if the adviser’s recommendation agrees with their signal, they appear as
if they ‘follow’ advice. This allows the less able decision makers to mimic the most able
decision makers more often.26 Since the signal of not consulting is stronger, relatively more
types are tempted to use it and distort their action. As a result, the equilibrium in which
this signal is used is less eﬃcient. In other words, p0 <p ∗ <q .
4.2 Strategic advisers
So far I assumed that the adviser A transmits his information truthfully. I now endogenize
the behavior of the adviser. In particular, the adviser may be careerist as well. Assume
25I thank a referee for suggesting this question.
26This is the reason why the equilibria in which decision makers ignore advice can be sustained for all
values of θ, as opposed to the equilibrium in which some decision makers do not consult.
17therefore that the accuracy of the adviser q is unknown to E and D,b u tt h e yk n o wi t s
density function g(q) over [.5,1]. Let the utility function of A be πA+θ
AI, where πA are the
beliefs of E on the type of A and θ
A ≥ 0 measures how much A cares about the outcome.
Finally, I allow the adviser A to transmit a message about (sA,q) which is not necessarily
truthful. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. It is common knowledge that Pr(w = h)=1
2.
2. w is realized, A receives a signal (sA,q) and D receives a signal (s,p) about w.
3. A transmits a message m ∈ {l,h}×[.5,1] about (sA,q).
4. D takes an action a given m, g(q), and (s,p).
5. E forms beliefs π on p, and πA on q, given a,m,w,f(p) and g(q).
It is then easy to prove the following:
Proposition 5 (The Sub-optimal Sharing of Information Result): For all θ
A, there is no
equilibrium in which the adviser always reveals his information (sA,q).
Proof: see the appendix.¥
Intuitively, consider an adviser who reﬂects whether to exaggerate the accuracy of his re-
port. If he poses as a more talented adviser, less types of the decision maker distort their
action, since they face a more accurate prior or advice. The decision maker is therefore
induced to behave more eﬃciently. This implies that if the adviser exaggerates his report,
he increases both his reputation, and the probability of receiving θ
A. He therefore has an in-
centive to fool the decision maker and an equilibrium with full information revelation cannot
exist. Thus, even if the adviser is only concerned about the outcome and has no concerns
about his reputation, i.e., for θ
A →∞ , he cannot transmit his information fully, since he
knows that the careerist decision maker distorts her actions and abuses his information.
To summarize, consultation in the presence of career concerns elicits low quality of informa-
tion. Although the career concerns of the adviser and the decision maker are not conﬂicting,
since they are not competing for the same job, the personal career concerns of either blocks
truthful information revelation.27
27I do not fully characterize the equilibria in the case of strategic advisers. In a companion working paper
(Levy, 2000) I show that contradicting an adviser still arises as a signal for high ability even in the presence
of strategic advisers.
185C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I have shown how a decision maker who is concerned about her career distorts
her decision by ‘anti-herding’. Following several papers that have introduced anti-herding
results in diﬀerent contexts, the paper generalizes this result and illustrates the necessary
conditions for its derivation. Career concerns are a necessary condition, and as long as career
concerns are individualistic, that is, the decision maker does not care about the reputation
of others, she must know her ability (type). Other assumptions are irrelevant. Anti-herding
is the unique informative equilibrium behavior even if the decision maker cares only for
reputation and has no outcome concerns. Anti-herding arises for any distribution over types,
and even when the signals of smart decision makers are not correlated. Finally, it arises if
the evaluator observes the environment only partially, i.e., he does not observe the state of
the world or the accuracy of the public prior.
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Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :(i) π(a,a,α∗) > π(a,a0,α∗):








where f(p|a,w,α∗) is the updated density function on p given the observations of a, w and the knowledge









f(p0|a,a0,α∗) for p ≥ p0 with a strict inequality for at least one pair of values p and
p0. We will show that the MLRP is satisﬁed in this case, since
f(p|a,a,α∗)
f(p|a,a0,α∗) increases with p.












1 − p0 for p>p
0 >p
∗ and 0 otherwise.
Hence,
f(p|l,l,α∗)
f(p|l,h,α∗) increases in p. A similar analysis holds for a = h.
(ii) If s∗ = l, then π(l,l,α∗) > π(h,h,α∗) and π(l,h,α∗) > π(h,l,α∗):





















f(p|h,h,α∗) =1if p>p ∗ and
f(p|l,l,α∗)





.5 pf(p|h,l,α∗)dp, we have to show that
f(p|l,h,α∗)
f(p|h,l,α∗) increases with p,
but it is trivial since
f(p|l,h,α∗)
f(p|h,l,α∗) =1if p>p ∗ and
f(p|l,h,α∗)
f(p|h,l,α∗) =0otherwise.
The analogous results for s∗ = h, part (iii), follow from symmetry.¥
Proof of Proposition 1: In particular, I will show that there is a unique cutoﬀ point p∗(q,θ) which
satisﬁes p∗(q,θ) <q , that the cutoﬀ p∗(q,θ) is increasing in θ and in q, and that when θ is suﬃciently
small, p∗(q,θ) is bounded for all q.
The proof of Lemma 3 establishes that the equilibrium (s∗,p ∗)s o l v e s
Pr(w = h|s∗,p ∗,q)






and that the solution admits s∗ = l. Consider now the case of p∗ ≥ q. By Lemma 2, the right-hand-side of
(5) is greater than 1, whereas by (3) the left-hand-side of (5) is smaller than 1. Hence, a solution exists by
continuity and it admits s∗ = l and p∗ <q .It is left to show the properties of p∗(q,θ) and its uniqueness.
Step 1: Characterizing the upper bound on p∗(q,θ):
Let s∗ = l. I will now show that there exists a unique ˜ p>. 5, such that for allp∗ ≥ (<)˜ p,π(h,h,α∗) ≤
(>)π(l,h,α∗) with equality only for p =˜ p. This shows that in equilibrium, p∗(q,θ) < ˜ p.



























and hence π(h,h,α∗) is a
monotonically decreasing function as long as p∗ < π(h,h,α∗) and a monotonically increasing function
21when p∗ > π(h,h,α∗). When p∗ → .5,p ∗ < π(h,h,α∗) and when p∗ → 1, π(h,h,α∗) <p ∗.
Therefore, there exists p∗ such that p∗ = π(h,h,α∗). Denote this value by p0. This value is unique since
dπ(h,h,α∗)
dp∗ |p∗=π(h,h,α∗) =0 .
On the other hand, π(l,l,α∗) and π(l,h,α∗) are averages over l for l>p ∗ and thus increase with
p∗ for all p∗ >. 5. Also, since only values of p>p ∗ are included in the computation of these averages,
π(h,w,α∗) >p ∗ for all p∗.B y t h e a b o v e , w h e n p∗ → 1, π(l,h,α∗) >p ∗ > π(h,h,α∗). When
p∗ = .5, π(h,h,α∗)=π(l,l,α∗) > π(l,h,α∗). Then, there must exist some p∗ ∈ (.5,1) satisfying
π(h,h,α∗)=π(l,h,α∗). Denote this value by ˜ p. Note that ˜ p<p 0 and that ˜ p is unique.
Step 2: Uniqueness: by step 1, when p∗ ∈ [.5, ˜ p],
dπ(l,w,α∗)
dp∗ > 0 and
dπ(h,h,α∗)
dp∗ < 0. A similar analysis
as in step 1 holds for
dπ(h,l,α∗)
dp∗ < 0. This implies that ∂
∂p∗kθ(α∗) > 0, and hence the solution is unique.
Step 3: The cutoﬀ point p∗(q,θ) is increasing in q and in θ :















∂q > 0 since ∂
∂q
Pr(w=h|s∗,p∗,q)
Pr(w=l|s∗,p∗,q) > 0, ∂














since kθ(α∗) > 1 in equilibrium. Hence, the solution p∗(q,θ) induces a lower value for
Pr(w=h|s∗,p∗,q)
Pr(w=l|s∗,p∗,q)
when θ is higher, implying that p∗(q,θ) is higher.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :The proposition involves several claims which will be shown separately in
diﬀerent steps.
Step 1: If E does not observe w, there exists a unique informative equilibrium, in which the decision
maker anti-herds whenever q is high enough.
Proof: Consider an equilibrium in which D behaves as in Proposition 1. That is, there exists a cutoﬀ point
(s0,p 0) such that she takes h iﬀ Pr(w = h|s,p,q) ≥ Pr(w = h|s0,p 0,q). Assume also that s0 = l. If
E believes that this is her strategy, then given each action, he can updates his beliefs about the state of the
world. In particular, denote by qa(α0),E ’s beliefs that w = a given an action a. These believes can be










0)+P r ( w=l|s,p,q)θ
22The right-hand-side (left-hand-side) is the expected utility of the decision maker from taking l(h). Consider
now p0 → 1
2. When p0 = 1
2, I show in Levy (2002) that qh(α0) >q l(α0). Since by Lemma 2 in this case
the reputation for following and contradicting is equal, the left-hand-side is larger than the right-hand-side.
On the other hand, for p0 → 1, and since in particular p0 > ˜ p,w h e r e˜ p is the value of the cutoﬀ point
which satisﬁes π(l,h,α)=π(h,h,α) and is deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 1, the right-hand-side is
higher than the left-hand-side. Thus, an equilibrium exists for all values of q. But also, for high enough
values of q, if p0 >q>˜ p, the right-hand-side is larger than the left-hand-side, implying by continuity that
in equilibrium p0 <q .Hence, whenever q>˜ p, this equilibrium must involve anti-herding.¤
Step 2: Anti-herding arises disregarding whether E or D observe q or not.
Proof: Proposition 1 proves the case when both observe q. When D does not observe q, then she believes
that she is found correct with probability
E(q)(1−p)
E(q)(1−p)+p(1−E(q)) if she follows the prior and
p(1−E(q))
E(q)(1−p)+p(1−E(q))
if she contradicts the prior. This is true no matter if E observes q or not since E observes w, and hence D
has only to conjecture what is the probability that the state is h or l. Thus, the equilibrium is equivalent
to the one with ˆ q = E(q). Finally, the case where E does not observe q but D does, is analyzed in Levy
(2000) and I refer the reader to the proof there.¤
Step 3: When D does not know p, in any informative equilibrium, she behaves eﬃciently, i.e., she follows
her signal for E(p) >qand follows the prior if E(p) <q .
Proof: I will show the claim for θ =0 . The result then must hold for positive values of θ, since these
values only increase the motivation to take the right decision. The expected utility from taking an action a
is








(1−E(p))(1−q)+E(p)q if s = h,
(1−E(p))q




When D does not know her type, she can contingent her strategy only on her signal s, that is, whether
s = h or s = l. Hence, α(s,p,q)=α(s,q) for all p. For brevity, let us denote the probability with which





[αhp +( 1− αl)(1 − p)]f(p)
R 1
.5[αhp +( 1− αl)(1 − p)]f(p)dp
dp
and analogously we can deﬁne the rest. We now consider equilibria in which either αl < 1 or αh < 1 (but
not both since there cannot be an informative equilibrium such that a decision maker is indiﬀerent given
both signals). It is ﬁr s te a s yt os e eu s i n gt h eM L R Pt h a ti fαl < (=)1 and αh =( <)1, then π(l,l,α) >
(<)π(h,h,α) and π(l,h,α) > (<)π(h,l,α). Also, for any a, π(a,a,α) > π(a,a0,α). I will now
23show αh =1 . Assume that αh < 1 and therefore αl =1 . This implies that the reputation from h is
higher than the reputation from l. Then, for any q and E(p), it is better to take h when s = h, implying
that αh =1 . Now, when E(p) >q ,it also has to be that αl =1 . Assume to the contrary that αl < 1.
Then the reputation from l is higher then the reputation from h. If E(p) >q ,then it is the case that when
s = l, there is a higher probability that the state is l. Then, it has to be that D takes l, so αl < 1 is not
an equilibrium. We conclude that when E(p) >q ,it must be that αl = αh =1 , and hence the decision
maker follows her signal. Finally, we need to show that when E(p) <q ,αl =0 . The proof shows that for
any αl ≤ 1, the utility from taking h when s = l is higher than from s = l.28 This implies that the only
possible equilibrium has αl =0 , implying that the decision maker always follows the prior.¤
Finally, it is trivial that if E does not observe whether the action of D contradicts or follows the prior
then the decision maker can only signal her type by taking the right decision, if at all. Thus, the conjunction
of Steps 1, 2 and 3 completes the proof of Proposition 2.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :In particular, I will show that the equilibrium is characterized by a cutoﬀ
point p0(q,θ) <q .Let us conjecture the equilibrium described in the Proposition. When the decision
maker does not consult for all types p>p 0(q,θ) and follows her signal, then her reputation is (where the











whereπN(a,a0,α0) can be similarly deﬁned. It is easy to see, by MLRP, thatπN(a,a,α0) > πN(a,a0,α0).We







When the decision maker consults for all p<p 0(q,θ) and follows advice, her reputation is (where the














In this case, the observation of w entails no information about the type of D since the decision is not
responsive to her signals. Note that πN(·,·,α0) > πA(·,·,α0) for any a and w, since the types who do not
consult are known to be in [p0(q,θ),1] whereas those who consult are in [.5,p 0(q,θ)]. Thus, the expected




28Detailes available upon request. The proof is techinically easy but tedious and long.












When p0(q,θ) → 1
2, then for high enough θ, the left-hand-side is higher from the right-hand-side because
q>p 0(q,θ), implying that the solution p0(q,θ) > 1
2. On the other hand, when p0(q,θ) ≥ q, then the
utility from not consulting is higher than that from consulting since both the reputation from not consulting
is higher and the probability of receiving θ. Hence, an equilibrium exists and satisﬁes p0(q,θ) <q . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Consider the equilibrium in which all types consult and the most able types
ignore advice. It is trivial to show that this equilibrium is analogous to the one described in Proposition 1.







where πf(a,a,α∗) is the reputation from following advice while taking the correct decision, πc(a,a,α∗)
is the reputation from contradicting advice and taking the correct decision, and so on. Now consider the equi-
librium ﬁxed point equation when some types do not consult, i.e., the equilibrium described in Proposition
3:
π
A(a,a, ¯ α)=¯ p(q,θ)π
N(a,a, ¯ α)+( 1− ¯ p(q,θ))π
N(a,a













Given the above, I now plug the solution of the ﬁxed point equation p∗(q,θ) from (7) to the ﬁxed point












which implies that at p∗(q,θ), the decision maker rather not consult, and hence the solution to the ﬁxed
point equation must admit a lower level of p, i.e., ¯ p(q,θ) <p ∗(q,θ).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :If A reveals all his information truthfully, given a message (sA,q), the
equilibrium is as described in Proposition 1. But then a deviation of a type q t oar e p o r to fq +ε increases
both the eﬃciency of decision making (and induces a higher probability to receive θ
A) and the beliefs of E.
Thus, no type can report his type truthfully.¥29
29The proof actually illustrates that the adviser cannot transmit truthfully any connected interval.
25